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CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE REVOLUTION AFTER EDSA: 
ISSUES OF RECONSTRUCTION AND PEOPLE EMPOWERMENT 
 
 
Florin T. Hilbay1 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In the Philippines, the struggle—if it may be called such—for a more responsive 
and accountable government is associated with the name of a freeway, the Epifaño delos 
Santos Avenue or EDSA.  It is there that in 1986 a great number of Filipinos belonging to 
all levels of society gathered en masse for several days to protest against a corrupt and 
inefficient government and, in the process, popularize the term People Power Revolution 
and show the world a rare political and social occurrence—the non-violent overthrow by 
the people themselves of a long standing administration whose powers were so deeply 
rooted in the society.  
 
In the language of the “whereas clauses” of the Provisional (Freedom) Constitution 
of the revolutionary government, the event was characterized as “a direct exercise of the 
power of the Filipino people” and having been “done in defiance of the 1973 Constitution.”  
Consequently, it resulted in the nullification of the existing order. President Corazon 
Aquino, exercising legislative powers as the head of the revolutionary government, initiated 
the drafting of a new constitution and the reorganization of the executive and the judiciary.2 
Amidst these expected changes in institutions and roles of the political actors was 
the recognition of the important role of the vast majority of Filipinos who participated in 
the four-day exercise.  That the new government claimed to have derived its mandate 
directly from the people only highlighted the obvious truth that institutions are mere 
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instrumentalities and political leaders mere agents, and with the demise of the old political 
institutions it became indispensable for the new ones to establish closer ties with those 
whom they sought to represent.  At the same time, the lessons derived by the people from 
past experience and the scar of mistrust that they carried gave birth to the idea that, for the 
new institutions to not only survive but be truly representative of the will of the sovereign, 
politics and its processes must be democratized. 
 
Thus, apart from the predictable political realignment after the revolution, the new 
government, aware of the important role played by the masses in the uprising, decided on a 
course that still continues up to this day—the idea of democratization of the political 
process. 
 
This paper focuses on the constitution as a document embodying this idea of 
democratization and points out that this was conscious attempt on the part of those who 
drafted it.  It analyzes, from a policy perspective, the changes made in the basic law and 
concludes that the net policy effects were as follows: 
a) The strengthening of institutions of accountability; 
b) The establishment of institutions that allow for a greater participation of the 
masses; 
c) The reconstruction of the powers of government with the aim of safeguarding 
against the abuse of public powers. 
 
This paper also discusses the role of Congress as the repository of the powers of the 
state and how it has carried out the constitutional mandate to widen the base for decision-
making and guard against abuse. 
 
Finally, decisions of the Supreme Court are discussed to ascertain how the Court, in 
actual cases and controversies, has treated the interesting interplay among the various 
political actors—the national government, local government, and the citizens—in the light 
of changed circumstances. 
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 I. The People Power Constitution 
One of the great lessons of the EDSA Revolution is that a tyrannical government 
faces the risk of losing sight of the crystallization of the silent dissent among its people; and 
in a country mired in poverty, the sources of discontent are quite easily identifiable. 
 
One of the first issues to be addressed was that of accountability. Doubtless, the 
political mind-set of the nation demanded for greater public accountability as an important 
ingredient in a reconstructed society and this required a re-scaling of the balance of power 
between the people and their representatives. 
The opportunity to formalize this mind-set came immediately after the popular 
uprising when the president, using her revolutionary powers, decided to form a 
constitutional commission to draft a new constitution.  
 
The result is the 1987 Constitution which, at the horizontal level, is a tripartite 
system of government with a bicameral legislature, the president, and the judiciary sharing 
co-equal powers very much similar to the structure followed in the United States.  This is a 
departure from the 1973 Constitution which allowed what former President Marcos termed 
Constitutional Authoritarianism.3  Under the former regime, while the theoretical tripartite 
structure was maintained, one of the distinguishing characteristics of such system, the 
separation of powers among the three branches of the government, most especially between 
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the executive and the legislature, was practically non-apparent as the Constitution itself 
allowed the president to legislate and thus override the acts of the legislature. 
 
In essence, under the 1987 Constitution, the realignment of the powers of the three 
departments of the national government had the effect of producing a “weaker” president.  
Provisions in the constitution had been placed in order to prevent the president from 
overpowering the other departments: he is now ineligible for any reelection4; his appointing 
power is now, in some cases, subject to the concurrence of the Commission on 
Appointments5; and his powers as Commander-in-Chief are substantially limited.6 
 
On the other hand, the judiciary was strengthened by expressly giving it the power 
“to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack 
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.”7  
This provision seeks to prevent the Court from avoiding the decision in some cases on the 
ground that the question posed was political in nature, as opposed to a legal one, which the 
Court did in many cases during the Marcos regime.  
What is more interesting, however, were the changes made at the vertical level of 
power structure for it resulted in two clearly identifiable themes:  
 
First, the constitution allowed for greater opportunities for the substantive exercise 
of the sovereign powers; these powers are what one may term collectively as the people 
power provisions of the constitution.  These provisions have two aspects, the first of which 
refers to those provisions favoring the direct exercise of people power, while the second 
refers to those provisions aimed at decentralizing the powers of the national government. 
 
Second, the constitution heightened the bar for the representatives by strengthening 
the provisions on public accountability.  
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A.  Proportional Representation in the House of Representatives 
The 1987 Constitution introduced the system of party-list representation in the 
House of Representatives. It is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election 
of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral 
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections.8 
The party-list system allows sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof 
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who 
lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and 
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become 
members of the House of Representatives.9 
 
Under Article VI, §5(1)-(2) of the Constitution— 
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be 
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, 
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their 
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, 
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list 
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. 
 
The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of 
the total number of representatives including those under the party list.  For 
three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of 
the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by 
law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous 
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be 
provided by law, except the religious sector. 
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  One of the vestiges of the American colonial rule is the majoritarian system of 
election or the winner-take-all system of electing public officers. Under the present 
electoral laws, a voter who wishes to exercise his right to vote is called to determine who 
among different individual candidates he wishes to elect.  Except for the election of 
members of the upper house of the Congress, all national elective offices require that the 
candidate obtain the highest number of votes. 
 
 While this type of system has the advantage of ensuring, in a fair electoral exercise, 
that those who win have the mandate of the most number of electors, it has been criticized 
for effectively denying representation to a large number of voters, producing legislation 
that fail to reflect the views of the public, discriminating against third parties, and 
discouraging voter turnout.10  Also, this system has the fundamental drawback of overly 
concentrating on personalities and therefore tends to encourage patronage politics in a 
culture where paying one’s debt of gratitude is so important.   
 
Under the partial proportional representation scheme adopted in the constitution, 
people who have strong ideological bonds or those who share similar political interests are 
given the opportunity to group themselves together and, if they are numerous enough, 
represent themselves in the lower house.  It therefore does away with the need for these 
groups to engage in incessant lobbying.  Also, since it is not a winner-take-all system, the 
parties, so long as they are able to obtain the minimum number of votes required by law, 
are guaranteed representation in the legislature notwithstanding that they did not obtain the 
highest number of votes for the party-list.    
 
In a way, it is also an incentive to some groups who claim a large following yet do 
not have their constituency concentrated in one district to become stakeholders in policy-
making instead of resorting to the streets or following an armed struggle in order to seek 
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redress for their grievances.  Finally, it produces legislators who are voted upon at a 
national level and who have a clearly defined and disclosed ideology. 
 
Verily, the idea behind this system is to open up the legislative system, at least a 
part of it, to groups that have a national following and who otherwise would not be able to 
elect members of legislature both in the upper and lower houses of the Congress because of 
the personality-based system of electing these representatives.11  This is consistent with the 
aim of widening the base for policy-making by allowing non-traditional groups the 
opportunity to take a direct part in  the legislative process as  legislators themselves. 
 
The Party-list Cases 
After the first elections for party-list representatives, two important questions were 
brought before the Supreme Court in Veterans Federation Party v. Commission on 
Elections.12 The first was whether the provision of the Constitution providing that the 
party-list shall constitute twenty percent of the members of the House of Representatives 
was a mandatory or a directory provision, that is, whether the Commission on Elections 
was duty-bound to proclaim as many parties as were required to make them constitute 
twenty percent of the entire membership of the House of Representatives.   
 
On the other hand, the second issue centered the proper interpretation of  §§11 and 
12 of Republic Act No. 7941, the implementing law for the party-list, which provides in 
part— 
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the 
following procedure shall be observed: 
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the 
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the 
elections.   
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two 
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled 
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to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) 
of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in the proportion to their 
total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or 
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. 
 
Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. — The 
COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or 
coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes 
received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to 
the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as 
against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. 
 
 With respect to the first issue, the Court held that there was no need to fill up twenty 
percent of the seats in the House of Representatives and that the Constitution merely sets up 
a maximum limit for members of the party-list.  According to the Court, the Constitution 
merely provides for the total percentage reserved for the party-list.  Thus, only those who 
are able to satisfy the two percent requirement of Sec.11 (b) are entitled to seats in the 
House of Representatives.   
 
As regards the manner of allocating seats for the party-list, the Court decided to 
invent a formula for what it called “Filipino-style” proportional representation which in 
effect simply means that the highest ranking party-list group is entitled to one seat for every 
two percent of the total number of votes cast for the entire system while all the others that 
are able to hurdle the two percent bar will be entitled to one seat regardless of the number 
of votes they obtain. 
 
 Several points may be raised regarding the Court’s decision on these issues, 
foremost of which is that to declare the twenty percent requirement of the Constitution as a 
mere maximum number is to effectively limit the participation of  party-list representatives 
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which is opposed to the avowed policy of opening up the system.  Following the ruling of 
the Court, it becomes clear that the ratio established by the Constitution between party-list 
representatives and regular district representatives is likewise eliminated.   
 
It should not also be forgotten that under the Constitution, the House of 
Representatives, under certain conditions, may increase its own number through a 
reapportionment law.  But, considering the fixed rule adopted by the Court in this case, any 
increase in the number of district representatives (which will have the effect of increasing 
the maximum number of party-list representatives) will not increase the number of party-
list representatives who may occupy the seats simply because the rule of one seat per two 
percent is not a rule of proportions.   
 
Also, to say that the twenty percent rule in the Constitution is only the maximum 
number of seats reserved for qualified members is to assume that it is possible that the 
twenty percent of the seats reserved can be filled up.  It is clear, however, that the simplistic 
formula adopted by the Court will prevent the reserved seats from ever being completed, 
thus negating the assumption made by the Court.  
 
  Policy-wise, the Veterans Federation case has a disincentive effect on parties and 
organizations of similar leanings to group themselves together, a known practice in other 
countries using proportional representation systems, in order to have a greater participation 
in the system because only the highest ranking party-list has the chance of obtaining more 
than one seat.  Also, it discourages party-list groups to participate in the process because of 
the slim chance of winning more than one seat.  It should be noted that, unlike regular 
district representatives whose constituency is limited to a single legislative district, party-
list groups have the entire country as their constituency and all other party-list groups as 
their competitors. 
 
  All in all, Veterans Federation fails to appreciate the context in which the 
provisions of the Constitution were drafted and serves as a dampener to organizations that 
 9
are interested in participating in the system.  Likewise, it veers away from the nature of a 
proportional representation system in that while the proportional representation system 
from which the Philippine model was copied (the German system in the Bundestag) treats 
all seats available as a pie which can be shared by qualifying party-list groups, the one 
adopted by the Court simply applies a one-seat per two percent rule which is patently not a 
system of proportions.   
 
The second case decided by the Supreme Court, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor 
Party, Et. Al. v. COMELEC,13 held that it was not enough that a party-list organization be 
able to get the required threshold number of votes, and that it was equally important that it 
be able to establish its status as a marginalized group.  
 
According to the Court, that political parties may participate in the party-list 
elections does not mean, however, that any political party – or any organization or group 
for that matter – may do so.  The requisite character of these parties or organizations must 
be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and 
in the implementing law. It held that it would not suffice for the candidate to claim 
representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is easy to 
claim and to feign.  The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent 
the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies.  
 
To be sure, one may argue that the decision favors marginalized groups in the sense 
that only those that are truly marginalized may now participate in the system.  The ruling, 
however, makes two very important assumptions.  First, it assumes that the only way to 
participate in the system is by claiming to be part of the marginalized sector.  Second, it 
assumes that those who are marginalized can easily be identified.  The first assumption is 
susceptible of easy circumvention while the second is impossible to operationalize.    
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Under the party-list system, the Constitution itself allows political parties to 
participate and there is no requirement that these political parties be marginalized.  In the 
implementing law, a political party “refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an 
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and 
which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and 
supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.” 14   The 
implication is clear—that a party disqualified on the ground that it does not belong to a 
marginalized sector can simply file its candidacy as a political party and thus obviate the 
need of proof that it represents a marginalized group.   
 
With respect to the requirement that a group be truly representative of a 
marginalized and underrepresented sector, the problem is that it is a complex question of 
fact, so much so that in this case, the Court remanded the case to the Commission on 
Elections for the purpose of determining whether the winning parties indeed were 
marginalized parties.  The truth is, there are no fixed standards for ascertaining whether a 
group is indeed representative of the marginalized and the under-represented.   
More important, it cannot be denied that an organization’s status as a marginalized 
and under-represented group is dynamic.  The question may be asked, what standards can 
be used for determining whether a gay rights group or an association of obese persons 
belong to the marginalized?   
 Finally, there is the practical issue that already hounds participants in the most 
recent party-list elections, which is that winning party-list groups can be barred from 
occupying the seats they have already won pending proof that they are truly marginalized, 
and so their term can waste way pending the determination of their real status.   
 
B. Initiative and Referendum 
 Under the Constitutional set-up, the power to legislate is lodged with the Congress 
which is composed of an upper chamber, called the Senate, and a lower chamber, called the 
House of Representatives.  The nature of the power of Congress  to legislate is considered 
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plenary, that is, it has the  discretion to determine for itself the necessity for the exercise of 
its own powers, subject only to the limitations imposed by the Constitution itself. 
 
While the party-list system dealt with the nature of the composition of the 
legislature, another one of those people power provisions in the Constitution is in the arena 
of legislation itself.  Art. VI, §1 gives to the Congress the general power to legislate with 
the significant addition of the phrase “except to the extent reserved to the people by the 
provision on initiative and referendum.”  The theory of our government is one wherein the 
powers exercised by legislature, as a body of representatives, are derived from those 
delegated by its citizens and the latter reserves to themselves, insofar as legislation is 
concerned, what is known as the constituent power or the power to alter the constitution.  
With the present constitution, while there is not alteration of the scope of the powers of the 
legislature, the plenary powers of congress is now subject to the exercise by the people of 
their right to directly enact an ordinary law. 
 
The system of initiative was unknown to the people of this country before the  1987 
Constitution.  It is an innovative system as under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only two 
methods of proposing amendments to the Constitution were recognized: (1) by Congress 
upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members and (2) by a constitutional convention.15 
 
 Thus, under Art. VI, §32 of the Constitution 
The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of 
initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people 
can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or 
part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the 
registration of a petition signed by at least ten per centum of the total 
number of registered voters, or which every legislative district must be 
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof. 
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 In addition to the power reserved to the people to enact national legislation, the 
Constitution also reserved to the people the right to propose amendments to the constitution 
itself. Art. XVII, §2 provides— 
 
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed 
by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum 
of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district 
must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters 
therein.  No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five 
years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once 
every five years thereafter. 
 The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of 
this right. 
  
 This power, however is not self-executory, and the right of the people to directly 
propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative and referendum 
would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides for its 
implementation.16  
 
To implement the provisions of the Constitution on initiative and referendum, 
Congress passed Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.  Under the 
law, initiative is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to 
propose and enact legislation through an election called for the purpose.  It recognized three 
systems of initiative, namely that on the Constitution, on the statutes and on local 
legislation.  Referendum, which may refer to statutes or to local law, is defined as the 
power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the 
purpose.17 
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It is interesting to note, however, that despite the implementing law passed by the 
Congress, the Supreme Court, in Defensor-Santiago v. Commission on Elections, held that 
the law was inadequate for the purpose of exercising the right of the people to propose 
amendments to the Constitution.  In dismissing the petition of several citizens to amend the 
Constitution to allow then President Fidel V. Ramos to seek a second term by lifting the 
term limits in the Constitution, it held that while the law intended to cover initiative to 
propose amendments to the Constitution, the law as worded and passed by Congress failed 
to fully operationalize the constitutional mandate.  Thus, the Commission on Elections 
could not cure the defect in the implementing legislation as Congress failed to provide 
sufficient standards for subordinate legislation. As Congress has yet to enact another 
legislation to implement the right to propose an amendment to the Constitution, the 
constitutional provision is thus still inoperative. 
 
C. The Ombudsman 
 The people power provisions of the Constitution are not limited to the grant of 
direct powers to the people to participate in the legislative process through the party-list 
system and in the provisions on initiative and referendum.  Another dimension of the effect 
of the people power is the need to protect the people from those who exercise the powers of 
the sovereign. 
The principle enshrined in the Constitution is that public office is a public trust; 
public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them 
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, 
and lead modest lives.18  This statement sets the tone for the multitude of changes leaning 
towards the protection of the people from those sworn to serve them.  
 The most potent institution created under the 1987 Constitution is the office of the 
Ombudsman.  Given the scope of its extensive powers, it is no doubt the Constitution’s 
answer to the public clamor for greater public accountability, so much so that it has been 
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dubbed as the protector of the people, a champion of the citizens, the eyes and ears of the 
people, and the super lawyer-for-free of the opposed and the downtrodden.19   
The Ombudsman’s mandate, as protectors of the people, is to act promptly on 
complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the 
government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants 
of the action and the result thereof.20   
Under Art. XI, §13, the office of the Ombudsman have the following powers, 
functions, and duties— 
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or 
omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such 
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. 
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or 
employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or 
instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or 
controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any 
act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or 
impropriety in the performance of public duties. 
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public 
official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, 
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance 
therewith. 
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such 
limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of 
documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office 
involving disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report 
any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action. 
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(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information 
necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if 
necessary, pertinent records and documents. 
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so 
warrant and with due prudence. 
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, 
and corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their 
elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and 
efficiency. 
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or 
perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law. 
 
It is noteworthy that the 1973 Constitution mandated the creation of an Ombudsman, 
then known as the Tanodbayan (now known as the Special Prosecutor).21   The present 
Ombudsman, however, is different from the Ombudsman of the 1973 Constitution in 
several respects.  First, the present Ombudsman is a creation of the Constitution itself, 
whereas its predecessor was mandated by the 1973 Constitution to be created by the 
national legislature.  The implication in this is that the structure of the present Ombudsman, 
as well as its powers enumerated in the Constitution cannot be altered by the legislature. 
Second, the office of the Ombudsman is an independent constitutional body whose office 
holder is removable only by impeachment; on the other hand, the 1973 Ombudsman is a 
statutory creation and was not endowed with the guaranty of independence and tenure.  
Third, present Ombudsman was not meant to be a prosecutory body, as the intention was to 
follow the European model of an Ombudsman whose effectiveness was derived from his 
power to use moral suasion and his power to publicize matters under his jurisdiction; on the 
contrary, the Tanodbayan of the 1973 Constitution was a prosecutor. 
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The favorable grant of powers to the Ombudsman does not end with the 
Constitution.  With the passage of Republic Act No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, 
the Ombudsman has indeed become a powerful institution; in fact, more powerful than 
intended by the Constitution Commission.   
 
The most important addition to the Ombudsman’s power under the law is the power 
to prosecute.  During the deliberations of the Constitution Commission that drafted the 
1987 Constitution, it was made clear by the sponsors of the ombudsman provisions that 
they did  not intend to give the office of the ombudsman prosecutory powers, the other 
powers of the ombudsman being sufficient enough. Also, they were really angling for the 
European model of an ombudsman whose powers rested more on his power to persuade 
and publicize.22   
 
 However, despite the opposition from some of the members of the Commission 
that the lack of prosecutory powers of the Ombudsman would reduce the office to a paper 
tiger, the proposal of the committee sponsors was sustained; nonetheless, in order not to tie 
the hands of congress—if ever it saw the need to arm the office with the power to prosecute, 
the Constitution itself provided that the ombudsman may “exercise such other powers or 
perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law.”    
 
The scope of the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman is just as far-reaching; its 
powers affect all elective and appointive officials of the government, local government, 
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, with the exception of 
officers removable only by impeachment or over members of congress and the judiciary.23   
 
Just as important and threatening is the power of the Ombudsman to impose 
preventive suspensions.  Under the law, the Ombudsman or his deputy may preventively 
suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his 
judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charges against such officer or 
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employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the 
performance of duty, (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the 
respondents’ continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.  The 
preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the office of the 
ombudsman but not more than six (6) months, without pay, except when the delay in the 
disposition of the case by the office of the ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence, or 
petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in 
computing the period of suspension herein provided.24 
 
The Supreme Court has also sustained the vast powers of the Ombudsman and 
interpreted them liberally.  In Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan,25 the Court held that the general 
power of investigation of the Ombudsman covers the lesser power to conduct a preliminary 
investigation; thus, the office of the special prosecutor (formerly the Tanodbayan) may no 
longer conduct such preliminary investigation unless duly authorized by the Ombudsman.  
 
In another case, the Court held that the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over 
cases cognizable the anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan, so that it may take over 
at any stage from any investigatory agency of the government the investigation of such 
cases.26   
 
With respect to the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate any illegal act or 
omission of public officials, it was held that the law does not qualify the nature of the 
illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman may 
investigate; nor does it require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or 
arise from the performance of official duty. 27    In deference to the investigatory and 
prosecutory powers of the ombudsman, the Court has also adopted a hands-off policy with 
respect to the exercise of the former’s discretion to dismiss a complaint or proceed with an 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
23R.A. No. 6770, §21  
24R.A. No. 6770, §24.  
25G. R. Nos. L-79690-707, April 27, 1988.  
26Cojuangco v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. Nos. 92319-20, October 2, 1990  
27Deloso v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 90951, November 21, 1990  
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investigation. 28   The Court also held that notwithstanding the passage of the Local 
Government Code, the Ombudsman retained the power to conduct administrative 
investigations against erring local government officials and impose sanctions based on its 
findings.29 
 
II. People Power Legislation 
 
A. The Local Government Code 
The vertical reconstruction of power relations was by no means limited only to the 
relation of the national government directly with the people; it likewise affected the 
dynamics between the national government and the local governments.30  Under Article X, 
§3— 
The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall 
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure 
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of 
recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local 
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide 
for the qualification, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, 
powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters 
relating to the organization and operation of the local units. 
 
 
 The mandate of the Constitution is for the territorial and political subdivisions to 
enjoy local autonomy.31  For the first time, local government units were granted the power 
to create and exclusively enjoy their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and 
charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent 
                                                           
28Young v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 110736, December 27, 1993; Ocampo v. Ombudsman, G.R. 
No. 103446-47, August 30, 1993; Jao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 104604 &111223, October 6, 1995.  
29Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole, G.R. No. 108072, December 12, 1995.  
30CONST., Art. X,§1.  The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the 
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays.  There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and 
the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.  
31CONST., Art. X,§2  
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with the basic policy of local autonomy.32  The guarantees extend to a just share in the 
national taxes,33 in an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of 
the national wealth within their respective areas,34 and in sectoral representation in local 
legislative bodies.35 
 
 Pursuant to these commands, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7160 or the Local 
Government Code of 1991.  From that moment on, the operative term for local 
governments has been autonomy.  Implementing the provisions of the Constitution, the 
local government code devolved from the government many areas of concern traditionally 
handled by the national government alone. 
 
 On the political level, two areas governed by the local government code stand out; 
the first is the nature of autonomy and the second refers to the power of the people to recall 
local elective officials. 
 
Local Autonomy 
 That the Constitution devotes one entire article on local government is a clear 
indication of the significance of the matter to those who framed it.  Indeed, autonomy for 
the local governments has been the aim ever since the United States, through President 
McKinley’s instruction of April 7, 1900, urged the colonial government to “devote [its] 
attention…to the establishment of municipal governments [which] shall be afforded the 
opportunity to manage their own local affairs to the fullest extent of which they are capable 
and subject to the least degree of supervision and control….”   
 
 In a case decided before the enactment of the Local Government Code, the Court 
held that decentralization meant devolution of national administration—but not of power—
to the local governments.  It pointed out that autonomy was either decentralization of 
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35CONST., Art. X,§9  
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administration or decentralization of power. The former occurs when the central 
government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden 
the base of government power and in the process make local governments more responsive 
and accountable, while at the same time relieving the central government of the burden of 
managing local affairs and enabling it to concentrate on national concerns; the latter, on the 
other hand, involves an abdication of political power in favor of the local government units 
declared to be autonomous in which case the local government is free to chart its own 
destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.36  
 
In another case, the Court resolved the “tug of war” between the national 
government and the local government in favor of the latter, holding that where a law is 
capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacanang and the 
other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of local 
autonomy.37  That case involved the appointing power of the then Minister of Budget and 
Management over provincial budget officers which provided that “All budget 
officers…shall be appointed henceforth by the Minister of Budget and management upon 
recommendation of the local chief executive concerned….”   
 
The facts show that the recommendee of the local chief executive was not qualified 
and thus the Minister of Budget and Management decided to fill up the vacancy pursuant to 
its own circular reserving to itself such power in cases where the local chief executive 
failed to recommend a qualified nominee.   
 
In reversing the decision of the Civil Service Commission and nullifying the 
circular, the Court ruled that when the Civil Service Commission interpreted the 
recommending power of the local chief executive as purely directory, it went against the 
letter and spirit of the constitutional provisions on local autonomy.  It therefore nullified the 
appointment made by the Ministry of Budget and Management and ordered it to ask for the 
submission by the local chief executive of qualified recommendees.  
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The Court has also used the policy of local autonomy to favor the local government 
in order to broaden its powers.  In a case,38 the Municipality of Santiago in Isabela province 
was converted into an Independent Component City through Republic Act 7720.  Under the 
Local Government Code, the conversion of a local government unit should be based on 
verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services such as income, 
population, and land area. 
 
The petitioners claimed that the municipality had not met the minimum income 
required for an independent component city as the Internal Revenue Allotments39 (IRAs) 
should not have been considered part of the income of the municipality.   
 
In ruling against the petitioners, the Court stated that the resolution of the 
controversy hinged on the correlative and contextual explication of the meaning of internal 
revenue allotments vis-à-vis the notion of income of a local government unit and the 
principles of local autonomy and decentralization.  It explained that with the broadened 
powers and responsibilities, local governments must now operate on a much wider scale.  
These expanded duties, all necessary consequences of its autonomy, are accompanied with 
a provision for reasonably adequate resources, one of which is the right of a local 
government unit to be allocated a just share in national taxes in the form of internal revenue 
allotments.  It follows that since these allotments accrue to the general fund of the local 
government and are used to finance its operations, then they should be considered income 
of the local government for purposes of determining whether it has satisfied the 
requirement of the local government code for upgrading the municipality into an 
independent component city. 
 
Curiously enough, the Court had the occasion to apply the same principle of local 
autonomy when Congress decided to downgrade the status of the now independent 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
37San Juan v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 92299, April 19, 1991.  
38Alvarez v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 11803, January 31, 1996.  
39Under the Local Government Code, Internal Revenue Allotments refer to the share of local government 
units from the national internal revenue taxes collected by the government.  See R.A. No. 7160, §§284-288. 
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component city of Santiago to a municipality.  The issue, this time, was the proper 
interpretation of Article X, Sec. 10 of the Constitution which provides— 
No province, city, municipality, or barangay, may be created, 
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in 
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and 
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the 
political units directly affected. 
 
The case turned on whether the downgrading of the City of Santiago required that a 
plebiscite be conducted to ascertain the will of the people in the community.  The 
petitioners argued in the affirmative while the respondents argued otherwise, claiming that 
the downgrading of the City of Santiago is not an act of creation, division, merger, 
abolition, or substantial alteration of the boundaries of the local government unit concerned. 
 
In holding that a plebiscite was needed to reject or accept the act of Congress, the 
court stated that “a close analysis of the constitutional provision will reveal that the creation, 
division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units 
involve a common denominator—material change in the political and economic rights of 
the local government units directly affected as well as the people therein.”  
 
The Court ruled that it was precisely for that reason that the Constitution requires 
the approval of the people “in the political units directly affected.”  It stressed that the 
rationale behind the provision of the constitution was to address the undesirable practice in 
the past whereby local government units were created, abolished, merged, or divided on the 
basis of vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people.  It therefore served as a 
checking mechanism to the exercise of legislative power and an instance where the people 
in their sovereign capacity were able to decide on a matter directly affecting them or direct 
democracy as opposed to democracy through people’s representatives.  Finally, it held that 
such ruling was in accord with the philosophy granting local governments greater 
autonomy in the determining their future. 
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 Recall 
 Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his 
term of office.40  In a real sense, it is local equivalent of EDSA with the sanction of law and 
a specific procedure for its exercise.  By analogy, one may liken it to what civilists term as 
a tacit resolutory condition or the power to rescind an agreement for failure of one party to 
comply with his contractual obligations.  The same is true in recall, the contract being the 
agreement between the elector and the elected that the latter will serve his constituency 
with competence and integrity.  This can be inferred from the statement of the Court in 
Garcia v. Commission on Elections when it characterized the people’s prerogative to 
remove a public officer as an “incident of their sovereign power.”   
 
Recall is a novelty of the 1973 Constitution.41  Pursuant to the 1973 Constitution, 
the national assembly enacted a local government code providing for the procedure for the 
exercise of the people of the right to recall.42  Under the Local Government Code of 1991, 
the provision on recall was retained with the added feature that the process can be initiated 
by a Preparatory Recall Assembly or a group of elected representatives.  In Garcia v. 
Commission on Elections, the petitioner questioned the constitutionality of this procedure 
arguing that only the people, by direct action, can initiate the removal of a local chief 
executive.  In dismissing the petition, the Court ruled that what the Constitution required 
what for the Congress to enact an “effective mechanism” for the exercise of the power of 
recall.  The legislature was not straightjacketed to one particular mechanism of initiating 
recall elections, and the power given was to select which among the means and methods of 
initiating recall elections are effective to carry out the judgment. 
                                                           
40Garcia v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 111511, October 5, 1993  
411973 CONST., Art. XI, §2 provides:  The Batasang Pambansa shall enact a local government code which 
may not thereafter be amended except by a majority vote of all its members, defining a more responsive and 
accountable local government structure wsith an effective system of recall, allocating among the different 
local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources….  
42Batas Pambansa Bldg. 337, §54 provides:  By whom exercised; Requisites. – (1) The power of recall shall be 
exercised by the registered voters of the unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs. 
(2)  Recall shall be validly initiated only upon the petition of at least twenty-five percent of the total number 
of registered voters in the local government unit concerned based on the election in which the local official 
sought to be recalled was elected.  
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 The power of recall for loss of confidence shall be exercised by the registered voters 
of a local government unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall 
belongs.43  §70 of R.A. No. 7160 provides in part— 
 Initiation of the Recall Process. – (a)  Recall may be initiated by a 
preparatory recall assembly or by the registered voters of the local 
government unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall 
belongs. 
 
(b) There shall be a preparatory recall assembly in every province, city, district, 
and municipality which shall be composed of the following: 
(1) Provincial Level. – All mayors, vice mayors, and sanggunian members of 
the municipalities and component cities. 
(2) City Level. – All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in 
the city; 
(3) Legislative District Level. – In cases where sangguniang panlalawigan 
members are elected by district, all elective municipal officials in the 
district; and in cases where the sangguniang panglungsod members are 
elected by district, all elective barangay officials in the district; and 
(4) Municipal Level. – All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay 
members in the municipality. 
(c) A majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members may convene in 
session in a public place and initiate a recall proceeding against any elective 
official in the local government unit concerned.  Recall of provincial, city, or 
municipal officials shall be validly initiated through a resolution adopted by 
a majority of all the members of the preparatory recall assembly concerned 
during its session called for the purpose. 
(d) Recall of any elective provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official may 
also be validly initiated upon petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%) 
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of the total number of registered voters in the local government unit 
concerned during the election in which the local official sought to be 
recalled was elected. 
 
 
The recall of an elective official shall be effective only upon the election and 
proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate receiving the highest number of 
votes cast during the election on recall; should the official sought to be recalled receive the 
highest number of votes, confidence in him is thereby affirmed, and he shall continue in 
office.44 
The case of Claudio v. Commission on Elections 45  focused on the proper 
interpretation of Sec.74 of the Local Government Code which provides— 
Limitations on Recall.—(a) Any elective local official may be the 
subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of 
confidence. 
(b)  No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the 
officials’ assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a 
regular local election. 
 
 In this case, the Preparatory Recall Assembly of the local government unit initiated 
a petition for recall of the local chief executive in his first year of office.  Arguing that he 
was protected by the one-year bar of Sec.74(b), petitioner asked the Court to nullify the 
recall proceedings.   
 
Against the theory that Sec. 74(b) provides for a period of repose to protect against 
disturbances created by partisan politics, the Court ruled the recall refers to the recall 
election itself and not to the process initiated by the Preparatory Recall Assembly.  It 
justified the ruling on the ground that what makes the recall effective is the vote of the 
people on the day of the election itself that the local elective official must be removed.  It 
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added that from the day an elective official assumes office, his acts become subject to 
scrutiny and criticism; that it is not always easy to determine when criticism of his 
performance is politically motivated or not. 
 
Claudio v. Commisssion on Elections posed a difficult legal issue of when an 
elective official may be recalled; more difficult, however, was the policy issue involved as 
its required the balancing of two equally important considerations.  On the part of the 
elective official, one may say that his term is a protective shield against needless politicking 
and that the period is for his benefit in the sense that between the power of the people to 
recall him (which is speculative until after he is effectively recalled) and the theory that a 
regularly elected official is deemed to have the support of the entire constituency, then the 
latter consideration should prevail. 
 
 In the end, the Court tilted the scale in favor of the electorate and thus added 
another pro-people power decision.  What clinched the case for the people is the idea that in 
politics, there is really no such thing as a honeymoon period between the public officer and 
his constituents and that to rule otherwise would limit the constitutional right of the people 
to seek redress for their grievances. 
 
In fact, the financial and political expense of recalling public officers is not a 
recognition of the right of the people to be fickle-minded but a recognition that in this 
jurisdiction, the people are better off knowing they have the power to release a Damocles’ 
Sword hanging over the head of their local officials.  
 
B. The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards Law 
 Another aspect of the people power mindset of the legislature is rooted on the need 
to lower the threshold for making public officers accountable.  Prior to 1986, the statutes 
governing the liability of public officers take the form of criminal, civil, and administrative 
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actions.  Criminal proceedings are governed by the Revised Penal Code46 and special 
laws47; civil proceedings are governed by the Civil Code48; administrative proceedings are 
governed by various special laws, especially the civil service law.49 
 
 As a reaction to the magnitude of the corruption committed during the Marcos 
regime, the legislature passed Republic Act No.7080 or the Plunder Law.  Under the law, 
any public officer who acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt 
or criminal acts in the aggregate amount of P75,000,000.00 shall be punished by reclusion 
perpetua to death. Just recently, the constitutionality of the statute was sustained by the 
Supreme Court after a challenge thereto was lodged by former President Joseph Estrada 
who is now preventively incarcerated for this crime.50 
 
 The legislature also passed Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and 
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.  The declared policy of this law is to 
promote a high standard of ethics in public service pursuant to the mandate of the 
Constitution.51  It adds on to the growing number of statutes aimed to curb corruption in the 
government.  Aside from the mandatory provisions of the law, it also enumerates hortatory 
provisions or so-called norms of conduct such as commitment to public interest, 
professionalism, justness and sincerity, political neutrality, responsiveness to the public, 
nationalism and patriotism, commitment to democracy, and simple living.52  
 
The highlight, however, of the statute is the fact that it addresses not only the 
obvious violations committed by public servants like conflict of interest and solicitation of 
gifts, but also the more common problems encountered by the people in dealing with public 
servants.  The Code, under pain of sanction, obligates public officers to act promptly on 
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letters and requests, submit annual performance reports, process documents and papers 
expeditiously, act immediately on public’s personal transactions, and make documents 
accessible to the public.53 
  
Conclusion 
 The mass uprising in 1986 gave the Philippine society an answer to the question of 
what is to be done when the political institutions fail, in an outrageous and unacceptable 
manner, to respond to the popular will.  It also gave an opportunity for Filipinos to 
restructure the institutions that influence public life.  The result is a constitution pregnant 
with the ideals of good governance, public accountability, and democratization of public 
power.   
 
 As a normative document, the constitution serves its purpose of not only setting 
down the rules by which everyone is to be governed but also of prescribing particular 
norms that should guide most especially those who participate in the affairs of the nation.  
But that is all that the constitution can achieve as a reconstructive document. 
 
 Ultimately, the issue lies in whether the policies in the organic law has seeped into 
the consciousness of the people.  For, as Rudolf Steiner argued, consciousness determines 
events, and the events chronicled by historians are a mode of expression of the 
consciousness characteristic of an age. 
 
It may therefore not be amiss to point out that anyone interested in analyzing 
attempts in the Philippines at empowering the people should never lose sight of the broader 
historical context involved.  The historical fact is that the Philippine society is a stranger to 
the notion of public accountability and responsibility, owing mainly to the more than three 
and a half centuries of foreign domination.  It is in this context that one should understand 
attempts at reconstruction and see that it is a continuing process of calibrating and re-
calibrating institutions in order that they may match the political mind-set of the nation.  
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For the long view of reconstruction is not simply to make institutional changes whenever 
there is a need for them, but ultimately to aid the political maturation of the nation.  This is 
as it should be, especially in a time of greater interaction among nations and increased 
complexity of domestic life that requires peoples and institutions to exhibit greater ability 
to balance competing values and norms. 
 
 30
